#Fully_occupied_Regime_Cadre_Prliament (100% regime supporter member of parliament ) EXTENDS STATE OF EMERGENCY BY FOUR MORE MONTHS

The regime extended the current State Of Emergency by four additional months. The State of Emergency was first declared in Oct. 2016 and was due to end in April.

The House of People’s Representative, dominated by the ruling EPRDF, during its regular meeting this morning unanimously approved the extension.

Speaking to the house while explaining the necessity for the extension, Defense Minister Siraj Fegessa, who is also the front man in the ‘command post’ implementing the decree, said, “anti-peace elements” mostly in border areas were still active. The minister is referring to months-long conflicts caused by military incursions by armed men from the Somali regional state into many localities in eastern and southern part of Oromia, (bordering the Ethiopian Somali regional state in east and southeast Ethiopia). The ongoing conflicts have left hundreds of civilians dead and the destruction of an undisclosed amount of properties. But there hasn’t been an official inquiry into the ongoing incident.

Siraj also said that although calm has largely returned throughout the country as the result of the SoE, several cases were registered in which groups and individuals were involved in printing and distribution of “inciting materials.” He also added that the command post was yet to apprehend “key players” of the year-long anti-government protests that eventually led the country to declare the current SoE.

A ministerial cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has declared the six-month SoE in October to contain intense protests, particularly in Oromia regional state. The protests were triggered as an immediate aftermath of a mass death of civilians at the annual Irreecha festival on Sunday, Oct. 2nd. A hysteric stampede was caused as a result of security officers’ act of firing live ammunition and rubber bullets into the air, as well as teargas bombs in the middle of major parts of a gathering of millions who started to protest at the festival. The incident has led to protests in dozens of cities and villages throughout the Oromia regional state, which, unlike the previous year-long protests that first began in Nov. 2015, have turned violent as protesters targeted foreign based and state-affiliated investments in the region.

The SoE was quickly followed by the arrest of tens of thousands of Ethiopians, marked by several violent acts by the regime’s security officials.

On March 26, an inquiry board tasked to look into the implementation of the SoE told the national parliament that 26, 130 Ethiopians were detained under SoE. Of these 475 were released after receiving ‘counseling’, while 4, 996 will be brought to a court. The remaining 20,659 were released after detention in various military camps for different periods of time, according to the inquiry board.

On March 15 the command post tasked to implement the SoE has lifted parts of the provision, including arrest without court warrants and the indefinite holding of detainees incommunicado. It also lifted the provision that the command post should monitor the contents of media and other publications, as well as curfews imposed restricting citizens’ access to industrial sites & other investment projects after 6:00 PM local time. However, Defense minister Siraj Fegessa hinted at a possible extension of the State of Emergency, which was followed by a statement on March 23 in the parliament by PM Hailemariam Desalegn who referred to a public opinion poll result, unknown to many Ethiopians, and said 80% of Ethiopians support the State of Emergency.

Human Rights Watch protests to EU over Ethiopia

"We strongly urge you to use future meetings with Ethiopia’s leadership to publicly and unequivocally call for the release of key opposition leaders such as Dr. Merera and Bekele Gerba, the lifting of abusive provisions of the state of emergency, an international investigation into the crackdown on government protests, and the repeal of longstanding restrictions on media and civil society. And as stated in the European parliament resolution, it would be beneficial to clarify what progress on human rights you expect from Ethiopia to maintain ongoing EU support. The European Union’s interests in Ethiopia are best served by taking a principled stance on the importance of human rights protections."

Here is the full letter 
Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs /
Vice-President of the European Commission
Rue de la Loi, Wetstraat 200
1049 Brussels
Brussels, March 23, 2017
Dear High Representative Mogherini,

Human Rights Watch wishes to express our deep 

disappointment over the one-sided statement issued by your office during your official visit to Ethiopia last week. In the public statement of March 17, 2017, you focus only on the important European Union partnerships with Ethiopia on humanitarian assistance, migration, refugees, and economic growth, and reiterate your support for the dialogue with the political opposition currently underway.

In our view the statement was a missed opportunity to state publicly and unequivocally that Ethiopia’s repressive response to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly – illustrated by the government’s brutal crackdown on protests– is not conducive to Ethiopia’s long-term stability or the EU’s ability to partner with Ethiopia on areas of mutual interest.
As you are aware, Ethiopia’s widespread human rights violations against its citizens means that Ethiopia is a country producing refugees and asylum seekers seeking safety.
Since November 2015 state security forces have killed hundreds and arrested tens of thousands of protesters, plunging Ethiopia into a human rights crisis. A state of emergency, called in October 2016, prescribes sweeping restrictions that go far beyond what is permissible under international law, eliminating what little space there was for the peaceful expression of critical views. The government has detained over 20,000 in “rehabilitation camps” since the state of emergency was declared, according to official figures. Widespread and long-standing restrictions on media and civil society groups continue to be enforced. Opposition leaders remain in detention on politically motivated charges, including Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) leader Dr. Merera Gudina, who was arrested following his attendance at a briefing on November 9 in Brussels organized by an MEP. Just three weeks before your visit, he was charged with “outrages against the constitution” and faces up to life in imprisonment.
Harassment through criminal charges, arbitrary detention of political opposition members and supporters, restrictions on financing, and registration problems have decimated opposition parties since the 2010 election. Actual or perceived members of opposition parties have difficulty accessing the benefits of development and humanitarian assistance, including that provided by the EU and its member states. This partisan system ensures that Ethiopians in rural or drought-vulnerable areas of the country are dependent on the government, bolstered by EU support, for their livelihoods, food aid, employment, and health care. This further constricts the space for political expression, dialogue and further undermines the effectiveness of opposition parties. From the government’s perspective, the strategy has been successful -- the ruling party and its affiliates won 100 percent of the seats in federal parliament in 2015 despite strong anti-government sentiments in many parts of the country as the protests would later illustrate.
Dismantling opposition parties, imprisoning critical opposition voices, and then inviting whomever remains to engage in a dialogue is not the “right direction,” as your statement said. Nor is having such a dialogue in the shadow of a state of emergency with wide-ranging restrictions on free expression rights. Moderate, yet still critical opposition voices, including Dr. Merera, should be part of any credible dialogue with the opposition, and this should have been stressed privately and publicly to the prime minister as critical for any meaningful dialogue. Your expression of support for political dialogue without acknowledging the systematic destruction of legally registered opposition parties and the suppression of basic human rights is not constructive to the EU’s partnership with Ethiopia.
Discussing economic partnerships during the state of emergency that followed 18 months of brutality partly triggered by the government’s abusive economic development approach illustrates our concern with your recent statement. The Ethiopian government has ignored the rights of those displaced by investment projects, failing to properly consult and compensate them. It begs the question: what polices or safeguards is the EU insisting are in place to ensure that economic development occurs with professed EU commitments to human rights respected?
In this light, the EU-Ethiopia Business Forum should be postponed until the abusive provisions of the state of emergency are lifted. Moreover, the government should make progress on implementing reforms that are crucial for a rights-respecting business environment, such as the repeal or substantial amendment of the Charities and Societies Proclamation.
The contrast between recent statements by the European parliament and the European Union could not be more stark. Parliament has consistently issued strong statements about the government’s brutal crackdown, including a resolution adopted in January 2016 that stated “respect for human rights and the rule of law are crucial to the EU’s policies to promote development in Ethiopia.” The resolution also stressed that the “EU should measure its financial support according to the country’s human rights record and the degree to which the Ethiopian Government promotes reforms towards democratization.” Parliamentary subcommittee hearings on Ethiopia followed in October. European Parliament actions signaled to the Ethiopian government and its people that there are repercussions for brutality against their own citizens – brutality that undermines European priorities in the Horn of Africa.
In contrast, the EU’s tepid approach, epitomized by your recent statement merely sends the message to the Ethiopian government that its repression and brutality carries no consequences or public condemnation from its most trusted friends, donors, and partners.
As all recognize, Ethiopia is an important partner of the EU in the areas of migration, development and economic growth. But these partnerships are dependent on long-term stability in Ethiopia and, thus, should be dependent on respect for basic human rights.
A further downward spiral in the human rights situation in this country of 100 million people could lead to dramatically increased humanitarian needs and out-migration from Ethiopia, all of which would contravene European and Ethiopian interests. This is where the EU’s focus should be.

PROTEST-DRIVEN ‘ECONOMIC REVOLUTION’: CAN IT SOLVE BREAD AND BUTTER QUESTIONS?

Periodically, the movers-and-shakers of Ethiopian politics raise their voices about overhauling the economy and creating better employment opportunities for unemployed people in the country. Such calls often follow general public discontents expressed in several ways and forms. The recent ‘economic revolution’ narrative introduced by the Oromia Regional State’s President Lemma Megerssa, following the yearlong anti-government protests that first began in the region, is one such example.

Ostensibly aimed at addressing the needs of the restless youth who are tired of empty promises and were at the forefront of the yearlong protests, the regional government appears to have taken a stronger stance to revamp the economy in order to create decent job opportunities and promote inclusive growth. To achieve this, high-level officials of the regional state have come up with a term called ‘economic revolution’.

So far it’s not clear whether this ‘economic revolution’ is a science-based (modern) or non-science based (pre-modern) economic model or ideology, but the embryonic phases of the term and its repeated use have somehow brought a breath of fresh air of hope for the youth in the region.

Protest-driven ‘economic revolution’

 With 17.5 % of all young people eligible for work lacking jobs, Ethiopia has one of the highest rates of youth unemployment in East Africa. Compared to Tanzania and Uganda, which have rates of 5.5% and 6.8% respectively, the high level of unemployment in Ethiopia remains a key concern for young people after leaving school. Recent evidence also suggests that the unemployment crisis is presenting serious challenges to the peace and stability as well as economic growth throughout the country in particular and the region at large.

Throughout 2016, Ethiopia has witnessed one of its worst social unrests since the ruling EPRDF-led government came to power in 1991. Without a doubt, the most significant unrest had flared up in November 2015 when the Oromo youth in Ginchi, a small town some 8o km west of Addis Abeba took to the streets to protest against a local football pitch transfer deal to prospective investors.

Inspired by earlier protests over the Addis Abeba Master Plan, the youth in Oromia, who were later joined by theircompatriots in Amhara regional state in the north, also raised concerns over historic injustice, lack of equal economic opportunities and political rights. Soon enough, these ongoing protests were brought to the attention of the international community when Olympic silver medallist Feyisa Lilesa displayed a crossed hand gesture made famous by protesters at the 2016 Rio Olympics. Notable opposition party leaders and major political and economic allies, especially the European Union, have also strongly condemned strongly criticized the regime in Ethiopia for not doing enough to address public grievances, especially the increasingly unacceptable level of unemployment and poverty.

Cornered by the above internal and external pressures, and troubled by the 15.5 percent of its own unemployed urban population, the Oromia regional government it now trying to make a policy shift to give priority to the unemployed youth; it named this initiative “economic revolution.’

Optimism aside, there are plenty of reasons to assume that this state-managed ‘economic revolution’ movement in the region is nothing more than a desperate attempt to respond to the demands of the youth and eventually regain political and social control over the protesting people. In addition to the region being still under a stifling state of emergency, two of the other practical reasons are the financing mechanisms and components of the ‘economic revolution’.

Financing mechanisms and components of the ‘economic revolution’

It was in October last year that Ethiopia’s President, Dr. Mulatu Teshome, announced the establishment of a 10 Billion Birr (approximately $ 436.7 Million) Revolving Youth Fund that will be used for youth economic empowerment in the country. Oromia’s share from this revolving youth fund stands at a total of 3.5 Billion Birr (approximately $ 154 million). The regional government claimed to have allocated an additional 2.6 Billion Birr (approximately $114 million), which will be mobilized from regional state bureaus, private banks, credit companies and civil servants through taxes. Overall, the combined youth fund envisages to respond to the economic needs of a total of 1.3 million young unemployed people.

Benefits from natural resource endowments being considered the primary channel, the regional government named a number of initiatives that will ignite the planned economic revolution. According to Addisu Arega, the region’s Communication Bureau Head, the first phase of the initiative targets transport (including oil and gas), agriculture, mining, and construction sectors. Some of the projects that have hitherto been identified include the establishment of the Oda Integrated Transport, Oromia Oil Company, Keenyaa Beverage, Ambo-Gnemer Manufacturing, and Oromia Construction.

On paper, it appears that the activities hold promise in terms of engaging hundreds of thousands of farmers and youth as shareholders. However, there are still serious concerns with these planned activities as some of them still seem to be investment plans that just went through a marathon of political decisions with little consideration of the reality on the ground; if the planned activities are to solve bread-and-butter questions, the regional government’s actions must be well-thought out and strategic.

Opportunities and constraints

The ‘economic revolution’ movement may not be a novel idea but there are signs that it has already created fresh optimism and solidarity among various groups within and outside the country. To an extent dissenting voices within the Diaspora now seem to be willing to give the regional government the benefit of the doubt by adopting a wait and see position. In fact, some of these diaspora-based ardent critics of the regional state have already started to engage with the region’s officials through social media platforms by presenting business options and alternative marketing strategies for the proposed economic activities. This is an encouraging sign; it is perfectly legitimate to anticipate that, if carefully planned and properly implemented, the new ‘economic revolution’ initiatives can be a step in the right direction in terms of creating jobs, building capacity and leveraging natural resources. Indirectly, this also means that it is highly likely to attain peace and promote political stability and democracy within the region and the wider country.

But this move should also address potential constraints. To this end, there are three interrelated challenges that should be addressed simultaneously.

First, all investment choices should take cost-effectiveness and profitability into account. They should also be best tailored to the needs and skills of the unemployed youth. At the moment, the nature and types of businesses that are being pursued by the regional government mainly target industries that will only benefit a few young people. The activities are largely concentrated around major cities in the Oromia regional state. Agricultural activities do not seem to be seriously taken into consideration as viable options. In a region like Oromia, an economic revolution that does not take commercial agriculture as an entry point will fail to provide a sustainable outcome for many young people. Considering the region’s immense potential for various market-orientated agricultural productions and young people’s prior experience in this economic sector, investing in agro-food processing sector would come as an obvious winning card to play.

Second, there is a need to have a transparent, accountable and competent leadership, which provides strategic oversight to the initiative, as well as the public-private partnership modality that it seeks to follow. The steering committee designated to coordinate the proposed ‘economic revolution’ constitutes businessmen and former and current notable political figures in the region. There is little or no effort to engage and integrate research and academic institutions and civil society organizations in the leadership circle. Although conventional public-private partnerships are usually limited to government and business ventures, having a university-public-private partnership could be a powerful tool in promoting knowledge-based and technologically-oriented economic development programs.

Third, a key feature of the ‘economic revolution’ has to be inclusiveness. The regional government has the mandate to make sure that no one is left behind when embarking on implementing the plans. Young people in every corner of the region, particularly most vulnerable groups including women and girls, should be given equal economic opportunity regardless of their background and political affiliation/ideology. Inclusiveness should encompass more than income; it should include skills development, decent employment, access to services and active participation in political process.

With this in mind, the regional government should recognize its envisioned ‘economic revolution’ as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  It could serve as a tool for solving bread and butter problems of the burgeoning youth in the region, but it also has to lay a foundation for good governance, democracy, and economic equality, something it has always disregarded at its own peril.

Now that there is already high expectation among young people, it is time for the regional government to walk the talk and stay true to its promises of creating better jobs. If this last attempt proves to be yet another failure, it’s highly likely that history will repeat itself, yet again.

Amnesty International: TPLF Regime failures to blame for dozens of deaths at rubbish dump

The death of more than 60 people in a landslide at a vast rubbish dump on the outskirts of the Ethiopian capital over the weekend is a clear case of dereliction of duty by the Ethiopian authorities, said Amnesty International today.

Dozens are still missing since the landslide at the 36-hectare Repi municipal dumpsite in Addis Ababa on 11 March, and many families have been left homeless after their makeshift houses were buried under tonnes of waste.

“The Ethiopian government is fully responsible for this totally preventable disaster. It was aware that the landfill was full to capacity but continued to use it regardless. It also let hundreds of people continue to live in close proximity to it,” said Muthoni Wanyeki, Amnesty International's Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes.

“These people, including many women and children, had no option but to live and work in such a hazardous environment because of the government’s failure to protect their right to adequate housing, and decent work.”

Now in its fifth decade, Repi – also known as Koshe, which means “dust” - is the oldest landfill in Addis Ababa, a city of more than 3.6 million people. More than 150 people were at the site when the landslide happened. Many of them had been scavenging items for sale while others lived there permanently, in unsafe makeshift housing.

“The government must do everything in its power to account for all those who are missing, provide survivors with adequate alternative housing, and safe and healthy working conditions,” said Muthoni Wanyeki.

“It must also ensure that a full-fledged inquiry is held to determine the specific

'It's life and death': how the growth of Addis Ababa has sparked racial tensions

Addis Ababa had a plan – to expand, and lead newly prosperous Ethiopia into a brave new century. But after protests led to a violent and harrowing state crackdown, what happens next could reverberate across Africa

Drive out of Addis Ababa’s new central business district, with its five-star hotels, banks and gleaming office blocks. Head south, along the traffic-choked avenues lined with new apartment blocks, cafes, cheap hotels and, in the neighbourhood where the European Union has its offices, several excellent restaurants. Go past a vast new church, the cement skeletons of several dozen unfinished housing developments, under a new highway and swing left round the vast construction site from which the new terminal for the Ethiopian capital’s main international airport is rising.

Here, the tarmac gives way to cobbles and grit and the city loosens its hold. Goats crop a parched field beside corrugated iron and breezeblock sheds, home to a shifting population of labourers and their families. Children in spotless uniforms neatly avoid fetid open drains as they walk home from school. Long-horned cattle wander. Beyond the airport, the road splits into a series of gravel tracks that quickly become dusty paths across fields, which take you to the village of Weregenu.

There is nothing remotely exceptional about Weregenu. It is just another cluster of flimsy homes like many others around, and within, Addis Ababa. Nor is there much exceptional about the series of demolitions here over recent months. As the Ethiopian capital expands, it needs housing, rubbish dumps, space for factories. All land is theoretically owned by the government, merely leased by tenants, and when the government says go, you have to go. So Weregenu’s thousand or so inhabitants know they are living on borrowed time. All have been warned that the bulldozers will come back.

“The police came with officials a few weeks ago. We had a day’s warning,” says Haile, a 19-year-old former resident. “Old people, children, pregnant women … It didn’t matter who you were or where you came from, your house was smashed to bits.”

“No one told us why they wanted the land, except it is needed for development. We’ve been living there for years and years. I grew up there. Now we have to find somewhere else, or pay rent – and we can’t afford it.”

All over the developing world, there are people with similar stories. By 2050, according to the UN, over half of Africa’s population will live in cities, a much lower proportion than elsewhere in the world but twice as high as now. Ethiopia is one of the countries where urbanisation is moving fastest, and like elsewhere the process is placing massive strain on established political, economic and social systems. One result, as elsewhere, is violence.

The unrest in Ethiopia started in late 2015 with a small demonstration at a town where locals suspected officials of planning to build on a popular football pitch and a forest reserve. They rapidly intensified, prompting a brutal reaction from security forces. This prompted more protests and, inevitably, more brutality. By early autumn last year, several hundred people were dead and the unrest had become a full-blown political crisis.

Accounts of the violence are harrowing. Security forces have shot into crowds of unarmed schoolchildren, students and farmers. Footage of such incidents shows teenagers bleeding on the ground just metres from officials. Police have gone from house to house hunting suspected protesters, combed universities for activists who are then beaten with rifle butts or worse, and picked up any politicians suspected of dissent. Many detainees simply disappear. There is evidence of extra-judicial executions, while prisoners describe being kept for weeks in solitary confinement in dark cells, subjected to successive interrogations and beatings.

“I had no idea if it was day or night,” one prisoner, a musician held for weeks in prison in Addis Ababa last year, remembers. “I was interrogated for about two weeks, and punched or slapped. Then they tied my wrists together and hung me up by my arms from a hook. They hit my hands with sticks, breaking the bones. I passed out.”

When he regained consciousness, the 31-year-old was treated for his injuries and then held for a further two months in a “big hall, deep underground” where more than 100 detainees lived on water and bread, using a bucket for a toilet. He later fled overseas, where he spoke to the Guardian.

Many of the protesters were young, so a high proportion of those killed or injured were teenagers. Security forces targeted those who provided assistance or shelter to suspected activists, too. Parents, friends and schoolmates were detained to pressure fugitive children to turn themselves in. Two teenage athletes who defected while in South Africa for a competition last summer described how friends and relatives had subsequently been roughed up and detained. “They have been rounding them up,” one said.

The protests continued throughout last year at a rate of more than one a day. Some factories were burned, a few vehicles torched and occasional stones thrown. The government described the protesters as “armed gangs”. The numbers of dead or injured demonstrators mounted.

The final act came in October at Bishoftu, a city 35km from Addis Ababa, during a vast religious festival. When some among the crowd of hundreds of thousands began to raise slogans against the government, security forces moved in, firing tear gas and, some witnesses claim, live ammunition. In the stampede that followed, at least 100 died, according to western officials who watch Ethiopia. Activists claim the number was many times higher. The news prompted a new wave of protests. A state of emergency was declared, followed by mass arrests.

Ethiopia had long been held up as one of Africa’s star economic performers and an island of stability in an anarchic region. Though recent months have been calmer, the fallout from the unrest of the last two years may still dramatically change the history of one of the continent’s most important countries – and possibly the future of hundreds of millions of people across the entire continent. The questions posed by the crisis here are vital ones. Does the accelerating expansion of cities – from Algiers to Dar es Salaam, from Cairo to Kinshasa – inevitably mean violence? Will urban development heal existing tensions between communities in fragile nations or aggravate them? Could it be economic success, rather than failure, that brings revolution?

‘We are marginalised in everything’

Gataa, an activist, is slim, small, bespectacled and in his mid-40s. He is inconspicuous, sitting and sipping water in northern Addis Ababa while he talks softly of protest, death, detention and violence.

Gataa (not his real name) is an Oromo, the largest single ethnic group within Ethiopia, comprising 35-40% of the population. The Oromo have played the principal role in the recent unrest, suffered the most significant casualties and been arrested in the greatest number.

Liyu police raids in Oromia testing Ethiopia’s semblance of calm

Ethiopia’s state-run TV Oromiyaa on Thursday abruptly ended its live transmission of the regular session of the Oromia Regional State legislature. Activists allege the order to halt the live cast came from Ethiopia’s intelligence services.

Clips from the brief broadcast shared on social media show an impassioned rebuke of the federal government over its complacency in the efforts to end ongoing raids and cross-border attacks against Oromo civilians by the Somali Regional State special police known as Liyu Police.

For the past three months, locals in five Oromia zones and 14 districts bordering the Somali region reported armed incursions by the notorious paramilitary security force. At least 150 civilians have been killed and many others injured in the attacks, which began in late December, according to locals.

The Liyu police was established in April 2007 following the attack by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) on a Chinese oil exploration field near the town of Abole. (The raid left 74 Ethiopian soldiers and nine Chinese workers dead.) Funded in part by grants from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the Liyu police was meant as a counterinsurgency force against ONLF rebels. It was created and led by Abdi Mohammed Omar (“Abdi Illey”), the current president of Somali Regional State, who was then the regional security chief.

The Liyu Police has been controversial from the start. In the lawless and largely forgotten Ogaden, the unit operates with total impunity at the behest of its founder, Abdi Illey. Ogadeni activists and human rights groups have documented egregious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, execution of civilians, rape, torture and destruction of villages.

Abdi Iley is the law in Ogaden and the Liyu Police is Iley’s arm to quash any dissent, far or near.

Thursday’s heated exchange at Caffee, which apparently forced the regional broadcaster to pull its live-feed, caps a week of tensions between the two quasi-federal states: Oromia and Ogaden. After weeks of public outcry, Oromia Regional State Government Communication Affairs Bureau Head, Addis Araga, told the Voice of America Afaan Oromo that armed groups from the Somali region have been conducting raids and have caused wanton destruction in 14 districts in Oromia. The affected districts are Qumbi, Cinaksan, Midhaga Tola, Gursum, Mayu Muluqe and Babile in East Hararghe; Bordode in West Hararghe; Dawe Sarar, Sawena, Mada Walabu and Rayitu in Bale; Gumi Eldelo and Liban in Guji; and Moyale in Borana.

Addisu noted that the armed attackers have two primary goals. First, illegal territorial expansion. This is evident in the fact that when the group ambushes a given area and the locals flee for their lives, they hoist the Somali region’s flag to make it appear it is their territory. “This is unacceptable by all measures,” Addisu told VOA. A long-running border and territorial dispute between the two states was settled by a referendum that’s held in October 2004. Except for a few rural villages, the area has been demarcated and the bordering states are governed by the terms of that referendum, Addisu said. (Oromia and Ogaden share a border that is more than 1000 kilometers long stretching from the northeast Jijiga highlands to the Kenyan border in the southeast.) The referendum was held in some 420 kebeles in 12 districts along the border. In the end, 80 percent of the residents in the disputed areas voted to join or stay in Oromia. Addisu says the results are final and binding. And that no new referendum will be held.

The second goal of the invading force is economic, according to Addisu. He acknowledged that lives have been lost and the force has been looting property.

Locals paint a much darker picture. Mothers and young girls have been gang raped, according to one Mayu resident, who spoke to OPride by phone. He said the attacking Liyu Police were fully armed and they moved about in armored vehicles brandishing machine guns and other heavy weapons. They stole cattle, goats, camels and other properties.

Oromia state officials insist they are trying to resolve the issue amicably in consultation with the Somali region. And that the Command Post, which is currently running the country, has intervened to stop the attack on civilians.

By contrast, the Somali Regional State is advancing two parallel narratives. On the one hand, they allege that armed troublemakers are coming into their state’s territory from Oromia and wrecking havoc and that its police force was only playing defense. On the other hand, according to Addisu, Somali authorities told Oromia officials that they did not know who the perpetrators are.

Addisu insists that “no Oromo should be killed in his home.” And that the perpetrators should be held accountable. Yet the killings continue.

Oromo lawmakers seem to confirm what locals told OPride and other media outlets: The so-called Command Post and federal authorities are tacitly enabling the abuses of Liyu police. Addisu said the Oromia state government does not believe federal forces took sides or were complicit in the attacks. But he said if that’s found to be true, a legal action will be taken since “no one is above the law” even though the emergency rule has effectively put the security forces above the law, a law which is already seen as good only on paper.

Over the years, the Liyu Police’s mandate has expanded far beyond fighting ONLF. According to a research by Landinfo, an independent body within the Norwegian Immigration Authorities, Liyu Police today is responsible “for protecting the border and for handling general security challenges in the region.” It operates regional checkpoints and patrols border areas, especially along the Ethiopia-Somalia border. In 2013, Liyu Police had an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 members. Its force has since grown to approximately 42,000, according to Landinfo.

Fariya Aliye, one of the lawmakers who spoke out at the heated Oromia Regional Council meeting, noted that in East and West Hararghe zones of Oromia alone, six districts have partly or fully fallen outside of the Oromia regional administration. And are not even receiving critical public services offered by the state. The assembly congregated in a grand hall in Adama town, 60 miles south of Addis Ababa, seemed uncomfortable as they listened to her testimony. It was so quiet that one could hear not only a pin drop from miles away but also the hissing of a long-suppressed volcano about to erupt.

Oromo and Somali authorities agree on one thing: people of the two regions lived side-by-side for a long time and share culture and generally enjoy cordial relations.

To the vast majority of the Oromo people, this is nothing short of an aggression, a proxy war by the ruling oligarchy to cow the Oromo into submission. Tigrean elites have been single-handedly ruling the country for over quarter a century. The Oromo have been staging massive protests that began in November 2015. Ethiopian authorities declared in October 2016 a state of emergency that seems to have brought a semblance of order, at least on the surface.

But as one young protest organizer told OPride recently, “what the Tigreans have failed to do with the Addis Ababa master plan, they are now trying to do it using the Liyu Police as its Trojan Horse and they want us to stay put.” In other words, the latest armed incursions by Liyu Police is yet another land grab scheme in the ongoing dispossession of the Oromo people from their lands.

An elder in the diaspora who hails from one of the Oromo districts threatened by the Liyu Police and who gave only his last name as Jilo said he feared not only for the future of peace and stability but also the future peaceful coexistence of the two peoples. “I see thick blood running as our mighty rivers.”

The feeling is widely shared. Oromo anger against the Tigrean dominated government in Addis runs high despite the detentions of thousands of youth who had gone to the streets to air popular grievances. After months of indoctrination, released detainees show no sign of backing down. In fact, the detention and indoctrination appear to have simply fueled their longstanding mistrust of the system.

“When will this government stop rubbing salt in our wounds?” ask many an enraged Oromo, at home and abroad.

Given growing divisions within the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), federal authorities are unlikely to reign in Abdi Iley’s horses of war, which the Oromo sense to be beholden and acting at the behest of the Tigrean top brass.

In the short run, this means that the semblance of calm that had returned to Ethiopia after the declaration of the state of emergency, albeit only on the surface, risks unraveling at the seams.

The impassioned plea from the Oromia council members shows growing discontent with the lack of application of the country’s pseudo-federation and its subversion using different administrative and security measures.

Federal authorities have largely turned a blind eye to simmering inter-state border conflicts in part because the ethnicized nature of the conflict eliminates prospects for an inter-ethnic alliance, as is becoming common among exiled dissidents, against the central government.

Abdi Iley’s latest gamble and similar border disputes between and within many other states point to deepening strains over the promises of the federation and the reality as lived by ordinary Oromos. As with Ogaden, other regions have armed militias that routinely raid and loot adjacent districts in Oromia. By contrast, people in Oromia have been fully disarmed. In some localities, even carrying a spear and a stick (ulee/shimala) can run afoul of the law. Oromia had such a counter-insurgency force back in the 2000s until it was disbanded by the order of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi with the recommendation of Samora Yunus, the Ethiopian army’s chief of staff.

Abdi Iley’s invading forces are hoping to exploit the security gap and the defenselessness of Oromo farmers and pastoralists who are already on the margins of the society. A fact that’s only made worse by the suffocating state of emergency, which has further militarized the Ethiopian state and made street protests unthinkable. But the storm continues to gather, hardening the public and forging consensus among the Oromo elite across political divides, including within the ruling party. It will only be a matter of time until the Oromo decides to arm itself in self-defense. That prospect bodes ill for the country’s long-term stability and future.

Even though many among the Oromo general public and established opposition groups dismiss it as a public relations stunt orchestrated from behind to woo the Oromo into its fold and distract it from its struggle, the OPDO under its new leader, Lamma Magarsa, is undeniably showing increasing assertiveness. In fact, his rhetoric and approach have raised some hope that the organization is finally beginning to respond to popular pressure. However, historically the OPDO has a perennial trouble of not living up to its rhetoric. A consistent underachiever, it simply lacks the organizational coherence and political adroitness to outmuscle and outmaneuver its dominant partner now the shaky EPRDF coalition, the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front.

DESPITE NATIONWIDE STATE OF EMERGENCY, SEVERAL BORDER INCURSIONS LEAVE MORE THAN 100 DEAD IN EAST AND SOUTHERN PART OF Oromia

Despite a six month nationwide state of emergency declared in Oct. 2016 and was hoped to restore a military style law and order throughout the country, weeks-long cross border incursions by armed militiamen into many localities in eastern and southern part of Oromia, (bordering the Ethiopian Somali regional state, in east and south east Ethiopia) have left more than 100 people dead and the destruction of unknown amount of properties, a local resident said in a phone interview with Addis Standard.

According to Abdurrahman Dubaa, a resident of Chinaksan town in east Hararghe, some 630km east of the capital Addis Abeba, many of the militiamen conducting cross border raids in various localities, including Chinaksan, Babile, Gursum and several other villages, are members of the Liyu Police, a special paramilitary force set up by the Somali regional state with the help of the federal government to counter rebel groups operating in the restive Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia, and are stationed in and around Ethiopia’s Somali regional state.

The border incursions have also affected areas in West Hararghe especially Bordede woreda, “where more than 30 civilians were killed overnight on Wed. Feb 22,” according to Abdurrahman. In south east of Ethiopia, some 450 km off the capital Addis Abeba, similar incidents have occurred in Bale zone in Swena, Meda Wolabu and Dawe Sererworedas, among others; as well as in Liben and Gumii Edelo woredas in Guji Zone of the Oromia regional state in southern Ethiopia. Abdurrahman further said that the number of people killed so far in various places in the last two weeks only was well “over 100.”

Admitting the incursions, Addisu Arega Kitessa, bureau head of the Oromia government communication affairs office, wrote on his Facebook page that armed militiamen “coming from the Somali regional state have engaged in military raids inside these woredas on several occasions.” Addisu further stated that the reason for these incursions by the armed militiamen was twofold. “The first is border expansion,” he wrote, “There are incidents that after crossing over to these areas, the armed militiamen engage in acts of hoisting the Ethiopian Somali regional state flag claiming the areas to be part of the Somali regional state,” he said.

The second reason is economic, according to Addisu. “After attacking the areas, these armed militiamen engage in looting of properties.” He further admitted that “lives were lost” in the last two months, but fail short of mentioning the exact number. He also fail short of identifying who exactly these armed militiaman were. However, he cautioned that the incidents have nothing to do with the people of both regions and the regional governments, adding, both the Oromia and the Ethiopian Somali regional governments were trying to “solve the matter peacefully”. Members of the command post tasked to implement the state of emergency were called to intervene in some areas, according to Addisu.

When asked by Addis Standard if the presence of members of the command post was helping to contain these deadly border incursions, Abdurrahman simply said, “[they are] becoming part of the problem than the solution.” Abdurrahman claimed there were several incidents where members of the command post have fired at civilians, a claim Addis Standard could not corroborate due to lack of sources willing to come forth.

In a statement sent to Addis Standard, an organization called Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa, said, in the past six months “hundreds of Ethiopian Somali Liyu Police…have entered into Oromia villages, attacked and killed and abducted hundreds of Oromos and looted properties; over 750 goats, sheep, and camels were taken.” The organization claims the number of people killed in recent skirmishes is more than 200.

On Thursday March 02, during a televised meeting of Caffee Oromia, the region’s parliament, which was chaired by Lemma Megerssa, president of the region, several members of the parliament were seen voicing their frustrations in what they indisputably asserted were the “violence and killings perpetrated” by the Liyu Police, but also by members of the federal police force, on several villages bordering the two regions. “

Perpetual 
In addition to being one of food insecurity prone areas, the boundary between the two neighboring regional states has been a hotly contested affair both before and after the Oct. 2004 border referendum, which was held to determine the residents’ choice for administrative status of border kebeles.

The referendum was conducted in 420 Kebeles located in 12 different Woredas across five zones of the Somali Regional state. Official results of the referendum say residents in close to 80% of the disputed areas have voted to be under the administration of the Oromia regional state. Addisu Arega Kitessa asserts the result of the referendum are “final” and will not be altered. But claims alleging voting irregularities persist. And subsequent ethnic conflicts have led to the displacement in late 2004 and early 2005 of more than 80,000 people on both sides.

Although to a lesser extent, clashes between the two communities triggered by meager resources have remained the hallmark in many Kebeles located in border areas between the two regions.

It is in the backdrop of this that the Somali regional state special force, known in Amharic as Liyu Police, was formed in 2007. The presence of this special force, established to counter threats from the secessionist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is often associated with several accounts of abuse against both ethnic Somalis thought to support ONLF and the Oromos by holding cross border raids for the purpose of territorial expansion and resource looting.

A report in May 2012 by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) accused the special force of “summarily” executing 10 men “during a March 2012 operation in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region.” “The Liyu police have been implicated in numerous serious abuses against civilians throughout the Somali region in the context of counterinsurgency operations,” it says.

“The purpose of Liyu Police is double edged,” says a professor of political science at the Addis Abeba University (AAU) who wants to remain anonymous. “It serves both as the savior of the regional state from ONLF’s encroachment and the safeguard of territorial expansion of the Somali regional state into the Oromia regional state across the border between the two regions. The Liyu police serves both these purposes with an extreme sense of impunity,” the professor said.

Although officials of the Somali regional state claim that the Liyu Police was established in “accordance [with] police proclamation that emanate from the national constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE),” the exact legal and constitutional status of the force remains a perplexing enigma.

Commenting on his Facebook page on Sunday Feb 26, a pro-government blogger and editor at Horn Affairs, Daniel Berhane, said, “The Somali regional state should be told in clear language that it should refrain from its irresponsible acts. To this end, the federal government should discharge its responsibilities.” According to Daniel, although several factors determine the recent clashes, “it is clear that there were disproportional use of force by the Liyu Police in several areas.”