The Horn of Africa country is in the throes of a ruinous civil war and an economic implosion. Despite growing international outcry and deepening domestic political crises, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appears intent on clinging to power by force.
The dire state of affairs is a far cry from the hopeful days of the 2018-19 promised reforms. In 2018, Abiy burst onto the scene promising, among many things, a free and fair election. Last month, Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (PP) claimed a landslide victory in the 21 June elections. Sadly, the latest election, the sixth such exercise since 1995, did not live up to even minimal expectations or standards of fairness. PP is slated to form a new government next month. Abiy’s early overtures to democratization were mere public relations stunts that were never meant to be realized. In effect, Ethiopians let a golden opportunity to reform and transition to democracy slip away, leaving in its wake horrid bewilderment, distrust, mutual denunciation, and the prospect for even more chaos and conflict.
Since the 1960s, the Ethiopian elite has squandered four splendid opportunities to forge a new, more inclusive, and representative social contract.
Something inherent in the Ethiopian imperial system seems to inhibit the “power elite,” chiefly tenants of the Arat Kilo palace in Finfinnee and their supporters, from undertaking a constructive reform agenda. There may be a range of causes for this. But the most obvious obstacles to reform are: a) incumbent’s avid lust for absolute power and a winner-takes-all political culture, b) pursuit of violence (over dialogue) to resolve political differences, and c) the outdated imperial streak to trample peoples’ identities and rights.
Since the creation of the modern empire-state in the last quarter of the 19th century, the monarchical system of the north prevailed throughout Ethiopia.
We leave out debate on the impact of the imperial onslaught on the peoples of the newly acquired provinces and focus on the experience of the polity put in place in their wake.
It is beyond question that the imperial system was despotic and distinctly cold toward the conquered peoples of the South. Those murky features are enough to preclude the prospect of liberal agenda during the early imperial days. However, there were opportunities for reform during Haile Selassie’s long rule and at the end of his reign in 1974. Both chances were wasted by the dominant political forces of the day. Again, there was a historic opportunity for reform in 1991.
Initially, the 1990s transition showed promise by radically altering the narrative of the old governing class. But it was botched by the “victorious” Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that dominated the EPRDF coalition. The latest opportunity for reform began in 2018. Despite early signs of hope, reform has veered away from the path to democracy. Let us now look deeper into the reasons behind those flops, which directly impact the current impasse.
The Qeerroo-led struggle that impelled TPLF to retreat to Mekelle had also forced the change in the EPRDF leadership with the selection of Abiy Ahmed as the coalition’s chair.
Initially, Abiy made several headline-grabbing pronouncements. Among these is the release of political prisoners, the return home of exiled opposition parties and activists, the opening up of political space and freedom of expression. He promised to liberalize the economy and hold a free and fair poll. And the new premier was widely praised, at home and abroad, for these overtures. Ending hostilities with Eritrea, which turned out to be a massive hoax, earned Abiy the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.
However, even as he basked in those successes, things went amiss on many fronts. The main worry stemmed from the premier’s contempt for the constitution, his crude praise of real or imagined imperial glory, and cavorting with forces actively campaigning to undo the federal structure. Abiy’s rhetorical excesses steadily detached him from his constituency in Oromia, the largest and most populous of Ethiopia’s ten federal states. Also, a vast gap emerged between the regime and all federalist forces, which is the overwhelming majority of the people of Ethiopia.
The war in Tigray was the extension of the repressive and violent impulses deployed against Abiy’s opponents in Oromia, Sidama, and Wolaita. For Abiy Ahmed’s anti-federalist supporters, degrading the TPLF, if successful, would have a domino effect leading to the defeat of other federalist forces. This now seems to have backfired. As things stand, the TPLF has sprung into action and humbled the federal and regional forces deployed against it. As with the Derg-era, numerous liberation forces operate in many parts of the country with significant unforeseen consequences. The alliance last month between the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) signaled the stiffening of resistance even more.
In all instances, all parties to the conflict need to reflect that the fortunes of war fluctuate and that negotiation remains the best way out of the quagmire.
