The new offensive has elicited sharp condemnation from a cross-section of Oromo society. The opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the largest and most popular party in Oromia, sharply criticized the federal government and said it was perturbed by Addis Abeba’s calls to “exterminate” OLA – often referred to as “Shane” by state media. The OFC called on the regime to stop use of such dehumanizing terms and to explore avenues for dialogue with the OLA. PM Abiy Ahmed recently appeared at a public library in battle fatigues and pledged to hit the OLA hard.
Reports from Oromia speak of intensifying fighting between the rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and coalition of troops drawn from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), the Oromo Regional State forces as well as ethnic units and militias from other regions. The bulk of the fighting is concentrated in southern Oromia, near the border with Kenya (Borena Zone) and in the central regions of Wellaga and Shewa. So far, it is difficult to independently verify the size and scale of the new fighting.
Abiy’s deployment of the extremist Amhara Fano militia in some of the conflict areas has added to Oromo anger and sense of unease. The OFC says these militias are operating outside regular chains of commands and engaged in acts of indiscriminate violence and land grabs. Interestingly, the regional government itself is now lending its voice to these widespread claims that Amhara militias are rampaging through Oromia and grabbing land, while piggybacking on the new offensive.
“We are not fighting [against] Shane so that more extremists can flourish… we will fight and destroy Shane, in the same manner we will destroy Amhara extremists [that are] causing problems,” Hailu Adugna, a spokesman for the regional government was quoted by local media as saying over the weekend.
The implications of the new conflict are dire. Oromia is already experiencing an acute humanitarian crisis, ranging from massive population displacement, drought and crop failures to rising unemployment and poverty. According to Oromo activists, thousands have already been displaced and some have
crossed the border into Kenya.
Nairobi is nervous about the spillover impact of the fighting in Oromia. It has kept some channels of contact with the Oromo insurgency in the hope it could encourage a negotiated settlement. Increasingly, that prospect is under considerable strain. Keen to keep Abiy on side and to secure its investment in the lucrative telecom sector, Kenya appears to be throwing its cautious
approach to Ethiopia. Oromo activists are worried.
Kenya is becoming embroiled in the conflict by lending Abiy a hand in crushing the OLA. Kenyan government contacts downplayed the claims and say there is no policy of active military collusion with Ethiopia to suppress the armed insurrection in Ethiopia. “Our traditional policy is to nudge conflict parties towards dialogue and not to make matters worse by taking sides,” a senior
Kenyan official told Sahan.
Despite such reassurances, Abiy has leverage over Kenya. The mutual defense and security pact grants Ethiopia some freedom to conduct cross-border military raids and hot pursuits. It is not unusual for the ENDF to cross over into Moyale and Marsabit in northern Kenya in operations targeting Oromo rebels. These
has been the pattern for decades. If Kenya seeks to curb this privilege, it would no doubt anger Abiy.
The massive investment by Safaricom in Ethiopia’s telecom sector certainly makes Kenya more vulnerable to Abiy’s machinations and weakens its hand in playing a more robust role in supporting coercive diplomacy in Ethiopia.
There is also a more pressing reason why Kenya sees some level of cooperation to contain OLA on the border as a price worth paying in exchange for greater progress in the mediation to broker a settlement with Tigray. All the involved parties in the mediation seem reluctant to speak openly about the status of the mediation. There are many reports - hard to verify -that speak of growing friction, tension and rivalries in the Kenya-US-AU mediation. Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU special envoy for the Horn, appears to have antagonized the Kenyans and the Americans, alike, by insisting on being the chief lead in the process.
Abiy’s new Oromia military adventurism is almost certain to fail. He may be able to temporarily subdue OLA and regain some control, but he is unlikely to buy sustainable peace. Imposing a military solution may work if one is able to enforce and protect it and turn into a qualitatively big political gain. On both counts, Abiy fails. He does not have the wherewithal to gain full functional control of Oromia; worse, he does not have a compelling blueprint for peace
that is sellable to the Oromos. His vision of coercive unity and of a centralized and authoritarian state grates against everything the Oromo nation holds dear.
